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CASE COMMENTS
Taxation-Reserve for Bad Debt
Taxpayers were partners operating eight finance offices in Alabama. They used the accrual method of accounting to report income
and the reserve method for bad debts as prescribed by section 166(c)
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.' As of May 31, 1960, the partnership books showed accounts receivable in the sum of $486,853.69
and a reserve for bad debts in the amount of $73,028.05. On June 1,
1960, the partners incorporated within the terms of section 3512
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and transferred all assets, including the face amount of accounts receivable, to the corporation in
exchange for stock in the corporation. However, in setting up the corporation books, the reserve for bad debts was deducted, reflecting the
net amount of accounts receivable. The Commissioner determined
that the reserve for bad debts should have been included as income
in the partnership's final fiscal year.' The district court,4 in a refund
30 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
3,"The two groups of registrants that obviously do fall within these
exclusions from the exemption (for conscientious objectors] are those whose
beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest
at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." Id. at 343. But see
Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace,
54 VA. L. REv. 1355, 1376 (1968). "Application of these requirements [for
a 'just war'] to any particular war necessarily involves the weighing of
political facts which the state itself has already considered. Therefore, it is
not surprising that opposition to such a war derived from that application
might be regarded as political rather than religious in character, and a threat
to good order."
39 McFadden has also been filed for appeal with the Supreme Court,
39 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1970), but it may be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction as was Sisson.
INash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970); for a discussion of the
Fifth Circuit decision, Nash v. United States, 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969),
and an explanation of the accural method of accounting, reserve for bad
debts, and accounts receivable see 72 W. VA. L. REv. 302 & n.1, 2, 4 (1970).
2 § 351 (a) General Rule
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to
a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock
or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange
such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 368
(c) ) of the corporation. For puiposes of this section, stock or
securities issued for services shall not be considered as issued in
return for property.
I "Upon examination, the Commissioner determined that for the fiscal
year ending January 31, 1961, the partnership should include as taxable in-
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suit, allowed taxpayer a recovery and the court of appeals5 reversed.
The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Fifth Circuit6 and
resolving a conflict between the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,'

held that the partnership, upon incorporating within the terms of
section 351, was not required to include in income the amount of the

bad debt reserve. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
Prior to Revenue Ruling 62-128,' there had apparently been
little dispute over the treatment of a bad debt reserve upon an incor-

poration within the provisions of section 351. Yet a similar statute
had been on the books since the Revenue Act of 1921. 9 Since the

come Seventy-three Thousand Twenty-eight and 05/100 Dollars ($73,028.05),
the bad debt reserve applicable to the accounts receivable transferred to
the corporation." Nash v. United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. [ 9513 (N.D.
Ala. 1968).
4Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), rev'g 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.
1969), aff'g 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9513 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
5Nash v. United States, 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'g, 68-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. f 9513 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
6Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), rev'g, 414 F.2d 627 (5th
Cir. 1969).
7
In Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966),
the Ninth Circuit had disagreed with the Commissioner's reasoning and held
that the bad debt reserve when transferred under a section 351 exchange
was not to be taxed as income.
8 A taxpayer, engaged in a business as a sole proprietor, transferred
all of the assets of his business, subject to its liabilities, to a corporation controlled by the transferor in a nontaxable exchange
under the provisions of section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. Prior to the transfer the business had, on its books of
account, a reserve for bad debts which had been accumulated by
additions for which the taxpayer had derived full tax benefits in
prior taxable years. Held, under these circumstances the reserve for
bad debts is not transferable to any other entity. Accordingly, the
reserve for bad debts represents ordinary income to the taxpayer
for the taxable year during which the transfer of the accounts
receivable was made, since during such time his need for the reserve
ceased.
Under similar circumstances, a partnership must likewise include
such reserve for bad debts in its final return as ordinary income.
However, to the extent that the additions to the reserve for bad debts
in prior years may not have resulted in tax benefits, they need not
be included in the transferor's gross income.
1962-2 Cum BuLL. 139 [citations omitted].
9REvm'Eu Acr oF 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (3), 42 Stat 230. In Estate
of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 112-13 (9th Cir. 1966), the court
observed that, prior to Revenue Ruling 62-128, there had never been a
reported case in which the Commissioner had taken the position that a bad

debt reserve should be restored to income upon incorporation.
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issuance of the ruling, much litigation"° and confusion had preceded
the Nash decision. The dispute in prior cases over the disposition of
the reserve for bad debts seems to have stemmed from a difference
in opinion as to what the reserve represents. The Internal Revenue
Service viewed the reserve as representing untaxed income, while
the taxpayer saw it as an allowance for bad debts which represented
a decrease in value recognized for tax purposes, a loss inherent in the
total of the receivables."
The tax benefit rule, 2 that is, a recovery of an item that has
produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to be added to income in the year of recovery, formed the basis of the Commissioner's
contention"3 that the reserve should be restored to income. The Commissioner felt that the unused amount of the bad debt reserve had to
be restored when the "need" for the reserve ended with the termination of the proprietorship or partnership. The concept that income
should be recognized when the "need" for maintaining the reserve
ceased was not novel. The Commissioner
had often treated the end
4
of "need" as a taxable event.'
The Court in Nash stated that Congress, if it desired to make the
end of "need" synonomous with "recovery", could make the tax
benefit rule read: "[A] bad debt reserve that has produced an income
tax benefit in a prior year is to be added to income in the year when
it was recovered or when its need is ended."' 5 In that context the

'0 See, e.g., Robert P. Hutton, 53 T.C. 37 (1969); Bird Management,
Inc., 48 T.C. 586 (1967); J. E. Hawes Corp., 44 T.C. 705 (1965). For a
detailed history of the litigation preceding the Supreme Court decision in
Nash see 72 W. VA. L. Re. 302, 304-06 (1970).
"1Stoffel, Treatment of Reserve Accounts on Incorporation and Liquidation, N.Y.U. 26Tm INST. ON FaD. TAx. 773, 773 (1968).
12 Cf. INT.REV. CODF OF 1954, § 111 (a): General Rule.Gross income does not include income attributable to the
recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or

delinquency amount, to the extent of the amount of the recovery

exclusion with respect to such debt, tax, or amount.
13 See, e.g., Max Schuster, 50 T.C. 98 (1968); West Seattle Nat'l Bank
of Seattle v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 341 (1959), af'd, 288 F.2d 47 (9th
Cir. 1961).
14 See, e.g., Argus, Inc., 45 T.C. 63 (1965); Geyer, Cornell & Newell,
Inc., 6 T.C. 96 (1946).
,5Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4 (1970).
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Court said the Commissioner's ruling would be honored, but it
did not feel free to state the tax benefit rule in those terms. 6 Rather,
the Court turned to section 351 (a) of the Code, which states that
no gain or loss shall be recognized upon transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for stock if immediately after the exchange
the transferrors of property are in control of the corporation."7
The Commissioner's position on the treatment of a bad debt
reserve was an attempt to give a section 351 transfer an entirely new
effect, specifically from a tax free transaction into a semi-taxable
event. 8 Following the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit,19 the Supreme
Court felt the deduction of the reserve from receivables upon incorporation conformed to the "reality of the transaction."2 Taxpayers
received stock equal in value to the net worth of the accounts transferred, that is, the face amount of receivables less the total of the
bad debt reserve.2" Since it was conceded that the reserve was reasonable and the stock received was equal to the net value of receivables, the Court felt there was no "recovery". 22
The Court reasoned that a tax benefit was received by the partnership when the bad debt reserve was initially taken as a deduction
and a double benefit would have occurred had the stock been issued
for the gross amount of receivables, but stated: "We do not, however,
understand how there can be a 'recovery' of the benefit of the bad
23
debt reserve when the receivables are transferred less the reserve.
Accordingly, the Court agreed with the position of the Ninth Circuit 24 that although the "need" for the bad debt had ceased, it did
not mark a "recovery" within the meaning of the tax benefit rule.2"
6

1id.
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 351.
8 Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization, 40 TAXEs

17

974, 977 (1962).
In the author's critical comment, he stated that the Commissioner's position
"flies directly in the teeth of the purpose of that section [section 351] to
promote incorporation."
19 Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1966).
The Ninth Circuit felt that the Tax Court's and the Commissioner's position
disregarded the "economic realities" of the situation. Schmidt was also
followed in Rowe v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. If 9162 (W.D. Ky.
1969), where the court, with a similar factual situation, stated the reasoning
of the Ninth Circuit was "controlling".
20 Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4 (1970).
21 Id.
,2

2
2

2

1d.

Id. at 5.

4 Estate
25

of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966).
Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).
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The Supreme Court decision in Nash hopefully resolves the
controversy over disposition of a bad debt reserve upon the transfer
of assets in a section 351 exchange. However, the opinion does not
go so far as to say that a bad debt reserve may never be restored to
income in a section 351 transfer. The decision was based on an exchange of assets for stock equal to the net value of accounts receivable. Therefore, where it can be determined that the value of stock issued to the transferor represents the face value of accounts receivable and disregards the bad debt reserve, there would be a "recovery" within the meaning of the tax benefit rule, and the recovery
would be considered a taxable event. Whether or not the Nash decision will be applied to a section 33726 liquidation with a similar

factual situation is left unanswered; however, in light of the economic
realities test applied in Schmidt and the apparent adoption of that
principle by the Supreme Court in Nash, it seems likely that a section 337 liquidation would not be considered a taxable event.
Dennis C. Sauter

Constitutional Law-Freedom of ReligionTax Exempt Status of Church Property
The plaintiff, an owner of real property, brought suit in the
New York courts seeking to enjoin the New York City Tax
Commission from granting property tax exemptions to religious
organizations on properties used solely for religious purposes. These
exemptions were authorized by state constitutional' and statutory
2

6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337 (a) General Rule.- If-

(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or
after June 22, 1954, and (2) within the 12-month period beginning
on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the
corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets
retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized
to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property
within such 12-month period.
'N. Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1:

Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general
laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting
real or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational
or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or
more of such purposes and not operating for profit.
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